In Sickness and In Health

11 March 2003 MOSCOW, Russia--In the early 20th century, every 10th man in the world lived in the Russian empire and, in its later years, every twentieth man lived in the Soviet Union. Today, every fortieth man in the world lives in Russia, and in the mid-21st century that figure will be more like every hundredth.

The population of Russia has dwindled many times. Last century, for instance, it was decimated by the revolution and the civil war, by hunger in 1932 and 1933, and by World War II. The decrease, especially during the Great Patriotic War, was much greater than the present one. But that is not the main difference. In the past, the population shrank usually as a result of a war, famine, or epidemic. At present, it is diminishing because most married couples do not want to have more than one child. The birth rate is evidence of this. In Russia, the birth rate coefficient was the lowest in 1999--only 1.17 children per woman. This means that during their lifetime every 100 women would give birth to 117 children. About 215 children-- nearly twice as much--need to be born for an equal number of parents and children.

Most couples want to have one child and it is usually believed (not by demographers, naturally) that this owes to the low standard of living and that things will improve if it is raised substantially. But let us look at the world’s present situation. Of the nearly 200 countries in the world, there is a small group with a very low birth rate. Besides Russia and the European republics of the former Soviet Union, it includes some East European states, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Japan--that is, countries (Spain and Italy) with living standards higher than Russia, and even countries (Germany and Japan) with a very high standard of living. Why do these countries find themselves together with Russia in the group with a very low birth rate and a high death rate?

Sociologists explain this phenomenon by the common totalitarian past. I don’t, however, know what the supposed connection is between the totalitarian past and the present reluctance of people to multiply. But, in my opinion, there is one. With the exception of small, Islamic Albania, the highest birth rate in Europe is recorded in France, a country long known for its democratic traditions.

OLD TREND

People with little knowledge of demography usually think that the decrease in population growth began in Russia in the 1990s and was brought about by the unsuccessful reforms. If only that were so! In fact, this process began in the 1960s and was first recorded in 1965. The birth rate then kept rapidly falling till the early 1980s. Nevertheless, the population did not dwindle. This was because so many people in Russia were young at the time. On the one hand, there were many young parents and children as a result, even though most families had few children. On the other, the death-rate was low because it was mainly old people that were dying. But the lower reproduction rates in the 1960s inevitably led to a decline in population in the 1990s, when the smaller generation of young people born in the 1960s and 1970s had reached the age at where they’re most likely to have children (20-30 years old) and the large number of people born in the prewar years had reached retirement age.

In the 1960s, families with two children prevailed in Russia; in the 1990s, most young people chose to have just one child. A large number of families with three or four children is necessary for increased reproduction rates. By the 1980s, the Soviet leaders finally realized that the demographic situation was deplorable. In 1981, the government adopted a resolution with the aim of increasing the birth rate and improving the upbringing of the younger generation. It provided for partly paid leave for mothers bringing up their kids, payments after the birth of a child, and other measures which brought marked, though short-term results. Far more children were born in 1982-1984 than in previous years. The birth rate jumped after 1986, when perestroika began. This was due partly to more sanguine societal expectations and the campaign against hard drinking. Two and a half million children were born in Russia in 1987 compared to 2,237,000 in 1981.

MAYBE BOOM

One of the main demographic features of Russia is the alternation between large and small generations. The range is wide: 2.8 million births in 1960, 1.8 million in 1968, 2.5 million in 1987, and 1.2 million in 1999. A new rise in the birth rate is expected in Russia now. All the children born in the 1980s are now reaching the age when the birth rate is the highest, while the smaller generation of people born in the 1960s and 1970s is now past this peak. If the birth rate does not change, the number of births in the next ten years will reach the figure recorded in the 1980s. This rise is already beginning, but, unfortunately, the present birth rate is very low. In 2000, the coefficient of population reproduction in Russia was 0.571. This means that every 1,000 parents will be replaced by only 571 children.

Russia’s leadership is aware of this acute demographic situation. In his address to parliament in July 2000, President Vladimir Putin said: “For several years now the population of Russia has been shrinking annually by an average of 750,000 people. We are faced with the real danger of becoming an old nation.” Unfortunately, no practical measures have been taken to improve the demographic situation.

So what next? Though the immediate future is not clear, the demographic future can be predicted quite exactly. A very accurate 20-year forecast (1920-1940) was once made by academician Stanislav Strumilin. There were also “scientifically founded” but inaccurate forecasts made by the Central Statistical Board and the State Planning Committee of the Soviet Union. They asserted that as our society drew nearer to communism, the life of the people would improve.

In the last few years forecasts about Russia’s demographic future have been made at home, abroad, and in various UN documents. All of them are very gloomy. Short-term forecasts are certainly more reliable than long-term ones.

In its official forecast, the Central Statistical Committee of Russia gives two figures for the population of our state for early 2016: 138.1 million (the average and most likely), and 130.3 million, the lowest estimate. Judging by the demographic situation of recent years, the real figure will be much closer to the minimum forecast.

The longer the period sampled, the less trustworthy the forecast. Forecasts for the period until 2050 are common now. According to the average variant of a super-optimistic forecast made by the United Nations in 1998, Russia will have a population of 121.3 million in 2050. Much lower figures are given in the forecasts of our demographers (far more sound, in my opinion). In the opinion of demographers at the Institute for Social and Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the population of our country will be 80.2 million in the middle of the 21st century. The demographers at the Institute of Economic Forecasting have worked out 12 variants of population growth in Russia taking into consideration different combinations of birth and death rates and external migration. Without an increase in migration, the population of Russia would be 86.5 million with a low birth rate and a high death rate and 111.7 million with a higher birth rate and a declining death rate. Thus, the highly qualified specialists at leading academic institutions have given almost the same figures.

To keep the population at the 2000 level (145.6 million), Russia needs an influx of 34.5 million people even with a growing birth rate and a declining death rate; it will need an influx of 68.8 million people if there is a low birth rate and a high death rate. But it is not only a matter of the size of the population. Its composition is important too. If the population decreases, the proportion of elderly (over 60 years) and old (over 75 years) people will rapidly increase.

The population of the mid-21st century will not simply be old, but also dependent. In Russia, a woman can retire at the age of 55 and a man at 60. So here old-age pensioners will make up about 40 percent of the population and only less than half will be employed. And most importantly, the proportion of young people will be very low.

Young people are the most active part of any society--the main force of renewal, modernization, scientific and technological progress, and social and economic development. … That is usually forgotten by people with little knowledge of demography. I have heard some people saying: “So what will happen if Russia has a population of 100, not 150 million? Wasn’t it enough when we had 100 million or even less before?” But at that time Russia had a very young and rapidly growing population rich in talent and able to stand the tests of the last century. Will the population in the mid-21st century be able to endure such ordeals?

Some hopes are being pinned on an influx of migrants. Is it possible? In the last ten years migration from former Soviet republics compensated for about half of the natural decrease in the population. But, because of the state migration policy’s emphasis on keeping aliens out, the trend has been halted. This policy has brought many misfortunes to the citizens of Russia in the past--and it will continue to do so.

By Victor Perevedentsev.