Georgia on The Edge

by Christopher Deliso 17 October 2001 TBILISI, 14 October (via Sarke)--A downed UN helicopter, three villages bombed, and allegations of foreign terrorists massing for war--it was quite a week in Abkhazia, Georgia. All indications are that the fractious "republic" is fast becoming the epicenter of a renewed conflict, pitting the Georgians against their Abkhaz neighbors--and the Russians who are backing them.

A ferocious war of words has exacerbated latent tensions, with both sides blaming the other for the recent outbursts of violence. Although it is still unclear as to who was responsible for shooting down the UN plane, The New York Times on 11 October echoed the charges of the Abkhaz government and Russia's Interfax news agency, claiming that it was the work of "rebels" from Georgia's Kodori Valley. The related Russian charge, that a mixed bag of Georgian and Chechen fighters were being massed in Kodori, has been reported for weeks in the Russian press and has been picked in BBC and AP reports. At very least, it seems that if Georgia is not losing the war, it is losing the PR battle.

Georgia is increasingly frustrated by the Russian/Abkhaz accusations against them, bristling at the lack of even-handed media coverage. Since Georgia does not control the region, it has little ability to report from it, either. Georgians fear that the impossibility for their own media to cover the developments in Abkhazia inevitably results in at best, a biased view of what goes on, and at worst, the reporting of outright lies in order to achieve a specific political goal. Indeed, all the latest reports on Abkhazia derive ultimately from Russian accounts or interviews with Abkhaz officials. Even news from Georgian agencies is reliant on Russian media. The lack of control on the ground for Georgia in Abkhazia, therefore, also translates into a lack of damage control. Georgians are suspicious of every new story that purports to implicate them in Abkhazia, for the simple reason that the Russians and Abkhazians can make up anything they want, since there is no countering media source present.

The only thing known for certain is that on 8 October, a UN plane carrying nine people was shot down over Kodori Valley. Although The New York Times followed Russian reports in claiming that Georgian rebels hit it with a shoulder-fired missile, this scenario should inspire suspicion. Certainly, the Georgian authorities would have nothing to gain by it; a source close to the government in Tbilisi said: "If Georgia does that, it's suicide for Georgia." Such a haphazard act of folly would be sure to bring on censure and attacks from the "international community," the same source added.

The implications are clear. According to Georgian opinion, the helicopter must have been shot down by pro-Abkhaz forces hostile to Georgia, who sought to blame the attack on Tbilisi and thus expand Russia's mandate to take action in Abkhazia. [...] Local sources say that the "clearly marked" plane was flying a "routine bi-weekly mission," both of which make it seem unlikely that the plane could have been hit by mistake by local Georgians. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the "rebels" of Kodori shot it down by mistake. As we will see, Georgia often alleges that Russian planes invade their airspace, so clearly this is an option. Yet even if some isolated Georgian group did shoot the helicopter down, they were not acting on orders from the government. It seems just as likely, however, that the Russians were behind it. No matter what really happened, one thing is clear--the Russians (and Abkhazians) are winning the war of words.

From Bad to Worse: Villages Bombed in Kodori

If it was in fact the Georgians who brought down the UN helicopter, then the subsequent bombing of three Georgian villages could be seen as retribution. If the Russians, however, were responsible, then the bombing would have to be seen as a continuation of the same tactic--bomb first and cash in later by blaming Georgia. Predictably, reactions have been sharp. In the wake of the bombings, Georgian Defense Minister David Tevzazde on 10 October ordered any plane violating Georgia's airspace to be shot down.

Indeed, why would the Georgians, as Russia alleges, bomb their own territory? Conversely, why would the Russians engage in such a blatant act of aggression? Although both sides have again accused each other over the attacks, several considerations seem to indicate that the Russians may be to blame.

First of all, the attacks took place in a region that Russia has repeatedly claimed is a staging-post for Georgian paramilitary units intent on raiding Abkhaz territory. According to Russian reports, a buildup of fighters has long been underway in Kodori. It seems, therefore, that this area would be a major target for Abkhazia and its defenders.

A second consideration is the political importance of maintaining "law and order." Kodori is generally regarded as "lawless" and has been the scene of three abductions since 1998--including the kidnappings, on 10 December last year, of two UN observers. The wild region is hard to police, and drug and weapons smuggling is rampant. Now, random explosions, massing militias, and downed UN planes are all being presented by the Russians as evidence of Georgia's inability to control its own territory. In the aftermath of the bombings, Russian Defense Minister Igor Ivanov angrily accused Georgia of failing to control its borders and of abetting the "terrorists."

A third factor that might indicate Russian involvement is that the bombings were swift and sudden, and took place at an hour (between 5 and 6 a.m) when few people would have been awake to witness them. Ostensibly, the Georgian presence in Kodori would have made the planes easily identifiable, had they been flying in broad daylight.

Finally, there is the matter of who was capable of launching such an attack, in which several planes and helicopters were used. According to Tbilisi, there is little doubt that Russia was behind it: "Georgia cannot say with certainty which country the bombers that crossed into Georgian territory belonged to," said Georgian Foreign Minister Irakly Menagarishvili. "But we can say with certainty that Abkhazia hardly has such means."

Caucasus Shotgun Diplomacy?

A new mandate in Chechnya and a continuation of the status quo in Abkhazia, are Russia's main concerns in the increasingly high-risk world of Caucasus shotgun diplomacy. In the wake of the 11 September attacks on the United States, Moscow has won concessions in the West regarding Chechnya, and Georgians fear that Moscow will interpret U.S. President George W. Bush's call to attack terrorists "wherever they may be" to mean an invasion of Georgia's Pankisi Gorge area.

As for Abkhazia, Russia has several reasons for maintaining de facto control. Besides the strategic Black Sea port of Sukhumi, Abkhazia is vital to the control of smuggling for Russia. Besides, the preservation of a buffer state with Georgia, and the leverage thus achieved, is in Russia's general interest.

The most specific and significant reason for Russia to remain in Abkhazia, however, is the Gudauta military base. Although it was supposed to be handed over to the Georgians on 1 July, the Russians vacillated, and Abkhaz citizens reportedly laid down in front of the Russian tanks, begging them to stay. According to Georgian sources, this base is important not only for its strategic location, but also because the Russians maintain some highly important and secret facilities there. Yet even if the base were turned over, how could the Georgian government keep control of it, given Abkhazia's de facto autonomy? According to the Georgians, the Abkhazians have begged the Russians to stay because they know that, without the Russians, they would be too weak to defend themselves against the Georgian army. And so, Russia will use the renewed conflict in Abkhazia as a pretext for both maintaining a "humanitarian" presence, and for keeping Gudauta indefinitely.

Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?

The presence of armed groups in the Kodori Valley (either "freedom fighters" or "terrorists," depending on who's speaking) remains the most explosive issue. While the Russians maintain that the ethnic Georgians are terrorists and that they are backed by transplanted Chechen terrorists, a softer view of these "freedom fighters" prevails in Georgia. The fighters in Kodori and other Abkhaz border regions are typically made up of those who were forced to leave their homes during the 1992-93 war. [...] In response to the frequent Russian complaint that Tbilisi does little to control these "bandits," the Georgians say the fighters are based in areas that they cannot control.

That Georgia has failed to crack down on alleged militants in Kodori has as much to do with its own military weaknesses as it does with its nationalistic fondness for the cause. [...] Immediately after the UN helicopter debacle and the mysterious bombings, Georgian Foreign Minister Menagarishvili on 10 October consulted with ambassadors from Italy, Germany, Greece, Holland, the UK and the European Union (EU), and France. Russia has put Georgia into a bind, forcing it to turn to European nations and structures, like the EU and OSCE, for relief.

Who Is Fighting Who?

Azeris and Arabs were two other groups that Abkhazia's foreign minister claims were represented in the 200-strong body of rebels surrounded this week in Kodori, led by Georgians and Chechens. Although the latter were mortal enemies in the Abkhazian rebellion in 1992, the ensuing Russian-Abkhazian alliance, and the continuing Russian pressure on both Georgia and Chechnya, have thawed relations somewhat. Still, Georgians and Chechens are no great friends, either; and if it is indeed true that Chechen rebels are backing Georgian paramilitaries, the BBC may well be right in positing that this is a marriage of inconvenience. [...]

In the rapidly shifting situation in Georgia, any sense of traditional alliances and antagonisms goes out the window. This is exacerbated by the sheer diversity of the region. The Abkhazian census of 1989 recorded the following ethnic groups: Georgians, Abkhazians, Armenians, Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Greeks, Jews, and Azeris. Today there are almost no Georgians in Abkhazia; the fact that 45 perent of the region's 525,000-strong pre-1992 population were ethnic Georgians shows why they believe it belongs to them.

The Grand Old Dream: A Pan-Caucasus Confederation

Over the centuries, the incredibly diverse mountain peoples of the Caucasus have been at times drawn towards unity against foreign oppressors, and at other times pushed into mutual animosity by the same intervention from powers abroad.

In 1918, however, a new day seemed to be dawning for the Caucasians. In that year, a new government was established in Sukhumi, called the "Mountain Peoples' Republic." Seeking to unify various small and scattered mountain tribes, the "Republic" was engineered by Abkhazians and Chechens, against the wishes of Georgia--at that time heavily influenced by Germany. The nations of the Caucasus have been the center of interventionist struggle between great powers like Russia, Turkey, and Iran; therefore, the Abkhaz initiative was regarded as a corrective providing a degree of self-determination for the peoples of the Caucasus. Although the government failed, Abkhaz thinkers and others today are still enthusiastic about a confederation of the Caucasians--including Georgia, the Azeris, and the Chechens--as a way of protecting themselves from foreign intervention.

Caucasian unity in the next few years looks more and more unlikely with each passing day. The propaganda war has been heating up, with Georgia threatening to shoot down any foreign plane trespassing on its airspace, and Russia claiming that Georgia is preparing mercenaries, some of whom allegedly fired on Russian troops in Abkhazia on 11 October. In this heated climate, Abkhazia's leader, Vladislav Ardzinba, has appealed to President Putin to "thwart Georgia's policy of state terrorism" and act militarily. In an ominous development, Abkhaz authorities have reported that volunteers from south Russia were coming to join with their forces.

While Georgia announced on 12 October that it has no plans to send troops to Abkhazia, any paramilitary groups remain beyond the control of the government, and may well push their own cause unwanted onto the authorities. Yet a Georgian-Russian war would be deeply unpalatable to the United States, trying as it is to recruit both countries for a common "war on terror"--while at the same time trying its best to ignore the charges of "terrorism" coming from both countries.

It would seem unlikely that a full-fledged war will be allowed to explode. Russia is seeking only to preserve its current position at Gudauta military base. However, the recent news that Abkhaz planes have bombed the rebels in Kodori Gorge, is a dangerous escalation of tensions. Abkhazia also raised the temperature by declaring on 12 October that it wants to join Russia, something which Georgia called "impudent and provocative." Georgia has also demanded that Russia leave Abkhazia for good. It looks like the situation will ultimately get worse before it gets better.