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Belgrade is once again cozying up to Russia, but it could lose as much as it gains from that relationship. From The Ukrainian Week.by Janusz Bugajski 31 July 2012
Serbia's presidential contest in May was fought primarily over prescriptions to rescue a faltering economy and root out pervasive corruption. The majority of angry citizens voted against incumbent Boris Tadic believing that Tomislav Nikolic could help alleviate their material distress. But despite bold election pledges, Nikolic's Progressive Party has little room for maneuver during the Europe-wide recession. In fact, economic conditions are likely to deteriorate further in Serbia over the coming year, and that leaves the question – how will Belgrade react?
Still, Nikolic promised during his campaign that "Serbia will not stray from its European path." Be that as it may, remaining on the “European path” will prove difficult if the new President begins to exploit the status of both Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, his election may encourage Serbian leaders in northern Kosovo and in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska to harden their positions and press more vehemently toward secession.
Nikolic's other maneuver will be to pivot toward Russia in order to gain financial and political backing. On his first foreign trip, Nikolic was warmly received in the Kremlin where President Vladimir Putin confirmed that the Serbs were Russia's spiritual brothers. But despite all this melodrama, the relationship between Moscow and Belgrade over many years has been marked by mutual exploitation rather than enduring love.
For Russia's rulers, all Slavic nations in the Balkans have been useful bridgeheads for gaining strategic access to the Mediterranean. Over the centuries, Moscow has courted Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, claiming Slavic Orthodox solidarity against foreign occupation. Those fighting in these states for independence from Ottoman rule welcomed Russian assistance. Moscow in turn demanded support for Russia's foreign ambitions vis-à-vis the major European powers.
Muscovite policy was replicated by Stalin when the communists seized power in the Balkans at the end of World War Two. But while Bulgaria remained loyal to Stalin, the Yugoslavs were the first to break with Moscow, and Belgrade was under constant threat of invasion by its Russian brothers. Tito smartly played off East against West and harbored no illusions about Russia's imperial ambitions.
When Milosevic captured the state and tore up the Yugoslav federation in the early 1990s he cunningly exploited Russia to defend himself against Western pressure. He needed Boris Yeltsin to demonstrate that Serbia was not alone while carving up territories in neighboring republics to create an ethnically homogenous state.
In turn, Yeltsin needed Milosevic to trumpet that Russia was still a major power even though it had lost its satellites and the Soviet Union had disintegrated. Belgrade played on Russia's superpower lust while Moscow manipulated Serbia's mini-imperialist dreams. With Belgrade's insistence, Russia was involved in all the post-Yugoslav peace settlements.
But unlike Milosevic, who manipulated Russia to his advantage, Serbian nationalists today seem naive and gullible. Nikolic once asserted that he would prefer to see Serbia as a Russian province rather than as a member of the EU. The Kremlin now views Serbia as a useful surrogate in the middle of the Balkans, where even its traditional ally, Bulgaria, has joined NATO and rejected several exploitative Russian energy deals.
Serbia is promoted by the Kremlin as a bastion against American influence throughout Southeastern Europe. Combining pressure, incentive, and blackmail, Russian officials have warned Belgrade that any move toward NATO membership would result in a loss of Russian support for not recognizing Kosovo. Moscow would also prefer that Belgrade remain outside the EU to avoid implementing its legal standards, especially in business transparency. Instead, Moscow proposes that Serbia join its opaque Eurasian economic bloc.
While in Moscow, Nikolic also claimed that he may recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states despite Georgia’s protests. Serbia’s parliament will evidently consider formal recognition during the coming weeks. Moscow has tried to entice and cajole various allies into recognizing the two breakaway territories, with almost no success. Although Serbia may calculate it will gain substantial Russian loans as a reward, such recognition will further dent its EU aspirations.
Nikolic took his begging bowl to Moscow seeking an $800 million loan, as Russia had previously promised a $1 billion dispersal but has delivered only $200 million so far. But the new Serbian government must carefully read the conditions of any loan. Russia is not dispensing charity; it is seeking to create political dependence and to control Serbia's energy infrastructure as its state companies develop pipeline projects across the Balkans. It is Belgrade's responsibility to make sure that the undying love that Nikolic has declared for Russia on behalf of the Serbian people does not result in Serbia becoming a victim of date rape.
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