Sooner or later, Russia will need a new crop of leaders. From openDemocracy.by Andrei Kolesnikov 27 February 2012
The main item on the post-election agenda, leaving out a possible confrontation scenario in the immediate aftermath of the 4 March election, might be formulated as follows: who will emerge as the future political leader(s) of Russia? Even if Vladimir Putin has a more or less comfortable majority and continues to rule the country (given that we have no idea what his first steps will actually be), his continued popularity is in no way guaranteed. No one has yet been able to refute the hypothesis of the American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, recently acknowledged by Mikhail Dmitriev and Sergey Belanovsky of Russia’s Center for Strategic Research: when a country grows in prosperity its emergent middle class begins to demand political freedom. In other words, discontent with Putin among the educated urban classes is here to stay. And if, on the contrary, oil prices drop and the new head of state is unable to maintain his increased social obligations at their previous level, we might begin to see unrest among his current core supporters, public sector employees.
But whatever happens, during Putin’s coming term both the political elite and the electorate will be looking for new leaders. The present election race includes a couple of dinosaurs from the 1990s, on the home straight of their political careers, who have spent the last decade sustaining the illusion of a political opposition and inevitably coming second and third in the popularity stakes – the Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and the head of the ultra-right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The LDPR is defined by its leader and is unlikely to survive the departure of the elderly Zhirinovsky.
The Communists will probably need to restructure, under pressure from competition in the shape of other communist and social democratic groups who are bound to emerge if electoral legislation is liberalized and small parties allowed to register. The core Communist Party supporter base, still hankering after the ideals of orthodox Stalinism, and whose lives have been defined by nostalgia for the USSR, is aging and will have ceased to influence Russia’s political climate by the end of the decade.
The future prospects of Putin’s other election rivals – the leader of the ostensibly social democratic Just Russia party, Sergey Mironov, and the oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, who has exchanged the alpine comforts of Courchevel for the biting cold of Moscow’s politically charged streets – are also unclear. Their role lies somewhere between classic “spoiling” (in Putin’s favor) and genuine political ambition that they nevertheless have to constantly stifle.
The right-liberal flank, which the Kremlin machine under arch manipulator Vladislav Surkov has been saving for itself, for a rainy day, is still empty. It cannot be ruled out that after substantial reformatting this niche might be occupied by the party of power, United Russia, largely discredited after the parliamentary elections and handed over to Dmitry Medvedev by Vladimir Putin. And in this guise it could become the power base for Medvedev’s own political ambitions – providing of course that his further prime-ministerial career is at least partially successful. For the moment, after committing political suicide by voluntarily relinquishing power to Putin, our lame duck president has seen his popularity in the polls drop from 18 percent in July 2011 to less than 1 percent today.
Obviously, the right-liberal position, controlled more or less as it is by the Kremlin, might be claimed by Mikhail Prokhorov. But his oligarchic aura, glamour, and links with government, not to mention his eclectic political policies, might alienate many upholders of liberal values.
Given the right conditions we might of course see the creation of a genuine liberal party representing both right- and left-wing tendencies, which could only become a significant electoral force if it united under its banner a number of potential leaders, from 1990s liberals Vladimir Ryzhkov and Boris Nemtsov to Grigory Yavlinsky and former Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin. Such a party could be started from scratch, and its figurehead could be Kudrin, a man who steered clear of politics but acquired mass charisma overnight when he made critical remarks in public about Medvedev. He has close links both with Vladimir Putin and with the architect of Russian privatization, the main “shadow” liberal, Anatoly Chubais, but over the last few months he has become very much his own man.
FUTURE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS
Putin’s ruling elite may also put forward their own leaders. One very promising candidate out of this circle would be Dmitry Rogozin, a populist politician
It would be easy to imagine a battle between two future giants: Rogozin, the Kremlin’s man, and Navalny from the counter-elite. But this would not be the best outcome for Russia.
However, our new leaders might be recruited far from the corridors of power or the streets of Moscow. They might well be completely new people. It is even possible that the test tube where they are fertilized will be the Russian provinces.