Give Yanukovych the Credit He’s Due

On the campaign trail earlier this year, Viktor Yanukovych pledged to end the divisiveness that had characterized recent Ukrainian politics and become the president of all Ukrainians, whether from the East or West, Russian or Ukrainian speakers, or followers of the Ukrainian or Russian brand of Orthodoxy.

But for many Western-leaning Ukrainians the signing last week of an agreement to extend the lease of a military base in Crimea to the Russian Black Sea Fleet for another 25 years – in exchange for cuts in gas prices – was only the latest confirmation that Ukraine was moving rapidly back into Moscow’s welcoming embrace. Led by Yulia Tymoshenko, who has seized on the first big opportunity to rally opposition forces since Yanukovych’s February election, opponents of the deal have outdone themselves in attacking the president for selling out the country.

Tymoshenko called the deal “an unprecedented step of national treason and shame,” while ex-speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk said, “This is a fight for Ukraine. Today we have to decide if Ukraine is a truly independent state or simply a territory with a coat of arms, flag, and borders, but without an international voice.” Even the Associated Press bought into that approach, saying in a news article about protests this weekend that the agreement was “the first concrete sign that newly elected President Viktor Yanukovych will steer Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit, reversing his pro-Western predecessor’s attempts to decrease Moscow’s influence.”

However, although his predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko, undoubtedly pursued a combative relationship with Russia, it is far too early to write off Yanukovych as a Russian stooge with a clear-cut mission of returning the country into any one “orbit.”

Yes, Yanukovych has done a poor job so far in acting as a unifier. Already as president-elect he took the controversial decision to invite the Moscow-based head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, to hold a service to mark his inauguration. That did not go down well with Ukrainian nationalists and also needlessly inflamed religious tensions.

In filling out his cabinet, Yanukovych also appointed a string of ministers seen as old-style, pro-Russian cronies, none so divisive as Education and Science Minister Dmitro Tabachnyk. Last year, Tabachnyk published an article in Izvestia that infuriated Ukrainians in the western part of the country with a claim that they “have practically nothing in common with the people of Greater Ukraine, not in mentality, not in religion, not in linguistics, not in the political arena.” One of Tabachnyk’s first moves was to remove the Ukrainian-language examination from the list of tests required for a bachelor’s degree, prompting hundreds of students to take to the streets in protest.

OPPORTUNITIES MISSED

In terms of the current Black Sea deal, a progressive president with reconciliation at the top of his list of priorities might have done a better job in heading off the predictable uproar over continuing to lease Ukrainian territory to a foreign nation, all the way through 2042.

Yanukovych could have framed the agreement in stark economic terms, instead of throwing in comments that seemed to indicate the deal was a sop to Russia (“The prolongation of the Black Sea Fleet’s presence in Sevastopol is essential to Russia”). He could have stressed more strongly that the estimated $40 billion in savings on gas imports over the next decade would stave off economic meltdown, contribute greatly toward the passing of a budget that would help ensure a new multibillion dollar credit line from the IMF, and improve the standard of living for all Ukrainians.

And, just as importantly, the president could have reached out to his Western-oriented countrymen by explaining that an improvement of Ukraine’s finances was the only way the country could hope to sign an association agreement on closer ties with the European Union in the near future. In response to the outrage over the deal with Moscow, he did reaffirm his commitment to EU integration and left the door open to a referendum on the EU agreement if the appropriate laws are passed (whether he would push his majority in parliament to pass those laws is another question).

For all the skeptics who might doubt the sincerity of those EU-friendly words, Yanukovych could have provided a reminder that it was, in fact, his government in 2006 that managed to give a fresh impetus to EU-Ukraine relations through launching negotiations on a new agreement. In addition, his inauguration speech as president painted Ukraine as “a bridge between East and West, simultaneously an integral part of Europe and the former Soviet Union.” And surprising many, he chose Brussels as his first foreign trip, not Moscow.

In a recent policy memo for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Ukraine expert Andrew Wilson even said Yanukovych could become something like Ukraine’s Richard Nixon:

“In the same way that Nixon’s anti-communist credentials gave him the political cover to engage China, Yanukovych’s links with Moscow and his support among Ukraine’s Russian speaking population may make it easier for him to engage with Europe. It is even possible that, through a policy of small but steady steps, Yanukovych could bring Ukraine closer to the EU than his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko’s often reckless attempts to claim a ‘European destiny.’ ”

Yanukovych might not fully appreciate the comparisons with Yanukovych might not fully appreciate the comparisons with Richard Nixon, but they do sound better than being accused prematurely of treason.