Which Yanukovych Won?

His former campaign manager portrays Viktor Yanukovych as a man beset by fears and frailties.

by BBC Monitoring 10 February 2010

In this psychological portrait of Viktor Yanukovych, published before the final round of presidential voting gave Yanukovych a close victory over Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, former opposition Party of Regions MP Taras Chornovil, who is now an unaffiliated member of parliament, concludes that Yanukovych was a good prime minister under former President Leonid Kuchma but would be a weak president. Chornovil charts Yanukovych's successes but believes that he was then spoiled by the desire for personal enrichment. The following is an edited text of BBC Monitoring’s excerpt from Chornovil’s article "Viktor Yanukovych: An attempt to analyze the history of the patient," published by the news and analysis website Ukrayinska Pravda on 1 February.

 

 

I shall obviously not be able any time soon to contemplate my former party colleague with complete impartiality [but I am] convinced that he has been demonstrating indisputable progress in human, just like in sociopolitical and national aspects, since 2003.

 

Explaining my mistake of that time, when I truly believed that this personal development would be irreversible, is today an unnecessary task and would not interest anyone. But obviously, all of us have to understand what has happened to the man, indeed, why the breakthrough took place and where the driving forces of this drastic regress are. This is because, even if he does not determine where the country should move for at least two years and even for more than five or 10 years in total, he will at least exert serious influence on this movement.

 

I guess that there were two basic reasons for this.

 

The first of them is […] Mr. Yanukovych's desire to make his way and to consolidate his grip on the strategic position of the second person of importance in the country [the prime minister’s office, held by Yanukovych from 2002 to 2005 under Kuchma, and in 2006-2007 under Viktor Yushchenko], the basic motivation of his career rise and political struggle till about autumn 2006.

 

Undoubtedly, the platform is very beneficial for his psychological profile. Strategic decisions are taken by number one [the president], who is the one to withstand the hailstorm of public criticism and bear responsibility in full. The number two gets the right to implement and develop things and to consolidate in general his positive perception in the eyes of the people; at the same time, having demonstrated his political loyalty, to gradually expand his own right to take independent decisions in his own sphere of activity. We can see an analogy in [incumbent Russian President] Dmitriy Medvedev's career growth […].

 

Back at the beginning of his great career, while paving his way to the Donetsk Region governor's post, Yanukovych skillfully found proper people, [and] got [the] necessary support for any obligations, though not using the method of rolling up [those who disobeyed] in asphalt en masse or dropping them down into deserted coal mines, as used to be done before him.

 

On the contrary, the classic Donetsk shoot-out was brought to a minimum under him. At that time he not only shut the mouths of the media and all malcontents, but also partially bound the hands of local criminals, at least those beyond control.

 

[Passage omitted: Chornovil says Yanukovych has been good for his Donetsk Region.]

 

This is probably due to his ability to be a good implementer. Viktor Yanukovych often met people who rendered invaluable services to him during his life. They were former USSR Supreme Council [parliament] member cosmonaut [Heorhiy] Berehovyy and [billionaire] Rinat Akhmetov who had reportedly solicited [former President Leonid] Kuchma for the post of governor for Yanukovych […]. Finally, it was Kuchma himself: he duly appreciated the results of the 2002 [elections] when Kuchma's For a United Ukraine bloc got into parliament only thanks to Donetsk Region.

 

Looking at this range of people who are of importance for Yanukovych and the way he treated them later, one is willing to ask a question: Mr. Yanukovych, do you remember these people [and what they have] done for you? Or, as it is often said, I forgive everything to [the person] whom I owe anything?

 

[Passage omitted: Chornovil discusses Yanukovych’s political career from 2003 to 2007.]

 

In terms of state administration, he acquired more resemblance to Yushchenko with his sybaritism and incorrigible laziness. Circumstances arose again when urgent projects were strangled by the demands of astronomical kickbacks, and it became unrealistic to approach the prime minister or even to hand over documents through MPs because everything had been focused on the well-known [Party of Regions MP Serhiy] Lyovochkin.

 

[Passage omitted: Chornovil says he became non-staff adviser to Yanukovych but had little personal access to him.]

 

In my opinion, [the] prime minister was more interested in [his own] commercial projects like those of the [government residences of] Mezhyhirya or Sukholuchchya, […] [or in] adventurous plans related to an increase in the scope of power by way of forming a constitutional majority [in parliament] or quite specific amendments to the law "On the Cabinet of Ministers." We can also add here the dubious views with regard to MAP [NATO Membership Action Plan] or the humanitarian sphere on the whole.

 

Thus, a situation had arisen when the person who previously announced and implemented [useful] initiatives […], secured a record rise in GDP, […] and carried out skilful and cautious policy with regard to Russia, turned out to […] have limited powers and a substantial dependence on [an inconsequent] president […].

 

This almost complete sovereignty resulted in a large-scale political crisis, dissolution of the Supreme Council [parliament] and ultimate loss of power. […] [Despite] his complete economic and organizational incapacity, Mr. Yanukovych demonstrated very good capabilities in securing his private interests.

 

[Passage omitted: Chornovil says Yushchenko was a poor president, but little difference between him and Yanukovych can be seen.]

 

But anyhow, it is difficult to explain [such] regressive processes […] with the trivial comment: he failed to pass the test with unlimited power and a good executor is not always a good leader.

 

I admit that we should search more profoundly here and appeal to the phenomenon of latent complexes and fears that has importance during the formation of self-actualization.

 

Mr. Yanukovych has already revealed a very broad spectrum of these phenomena: due to his [reluctance] […] to debate with Tymoshenko, though he twice fought as an equal against […] Yushchenko in more difficult times, it becomes clear that hang-ups and fears have a motivational impact on him.

 

A number of these problems have their sources in childhood and youth, but this period in the biography of the Party of Regions' leader is covered by a sea of secrets, reservations, stolen documents and insinuations.

 

[Passage omitted: Chornovil says few politicians are willing to speak openly about personal biography.]

 

Talking about the two major politicians of our day, we know at least something about Tymoshenko. A well-described youth in Dnipropetrovsk is enough to form a psychological portrait with all internal motivations, goals and permissible limits for achieving them.

 

[Passage omitted: two biographical episodes of Yanukovych.]

 

But for some reason Mr. Yanukovych fears his past like his own death. During his election campaign trips he could speak for hours, either in a car or during a dinner, about golf, cars, the aforementioned Mezhyhirya, hunting and even attempts on his life, but he did not mention anything that had happened before the haulage company [where he worked at the beginning of his career] a single time in my presence. But this is surprising, as there had been nothing of which he should have [felt panic] or regarded as unjustified shame. An orphanage, hunger in childhood, post-war [coal-mining region of] Donbas, a large number of criminals around whose hands developed the regional economy […]. Hundreds of thousands of talented and promising people would not have got out and would have ended up with alcoholic mania or with a knife in a drunken brawl.

 

The problem lies not in the things that happened but in the silence kept on this […]. Practically everything can be adequately explained, perhaps except for unprovoked cruel murder, rape and conscious lengthy violence against an innocent person. Meanwhile, one can suffer extremely unimportant and insubstantial political losses, but protect himself from blame and suspicion for one's entire future.

 

Even if we [take] […] the Internet [rumor] that Viktor Yanukovych's father and uncle allegedly served in local police during the [Second World] war, even this fact, […] is likely to serve as grounds for compassion and understanding, but not for censure.

Hundreds of thousands of imprisoned Red Army soldiers [deemed traitors] by Stalin for this had an option: service in the occupying authorities or death. Eventually, they served not the Germans, who had entered the village of Yanuky or neighboring settlements only once or twice in the course of the entire war but, as one can say today, the local territorial community.

 

The fact that Fedir Yanukovych mentioned in the documents, had been indeed Viktor

Yanukovych's father, released after the investigation, serves as proof that not a single crime had been disclosed with relation to him. But, taking into account the dark times of Stalinist terror, in order to protect a child from […] public brand of disgrace, a child was handed over to his grandmother into foster care, having actually destined him for an orphanage. […]

 

Therefore, fear of disclosure [of his past] remains Viktor Yanukovych's first and fundamental phobia. It pushes him into new and inadequate actions of the kind of elimination of documents in courts and desire to […] [silence] journalists […].

I cannot imagine how one can live with this in general, to say nothing about governing the country. This [feeling] is even worse than for Kuchma after the [journalist murdered in 2000, Georgy] Gongadze case: the fear of meeting the media, the fear of traveling to other foreign countries where leaders are less tolerant than ours (you can recall the intentional change of alphabet [from English to French] for seating at a NATO summit [when Kuchma was present there]). Thus, one begins isolating oneself and isolating the whole country.

 

[Passage omitted: example from Chornovil's life.]

 

There is another phobia which, being partially justified, began gaining characteristics of dependence in the course of time. It also originates back from the Donetsk period [and] it is the fear for his private security.

 

Having survived terrible exchanges of shots in Donetsk, the assassination of [Donetsk businessman and MP] Yevhen Shcherban and finally, the experience of suppressing them by demonstrative shoot-outs with guns and explosives, anyone would be forced to think about personal security. Viktor Yanukovych has told many people that once a cruel attempt on his life was also committed. It was an attempt to poison him fatally, and he says that only a miracle saved him.

 

Following this, the security of the Party of Regions' leader was increased.

 

[Passage omitted: Chornovil says politicians in any country need strong personal security, but not to excess as is the case with Yanukovych.]

 

But I am placing emphasis on the worst consequence of this phobia. This is when a person begins feeling threat and hostility from every passer-by, even from well-known people. I am not aware of whether an aggressive reaction to some people asking awkward questions is a symptom of this condition. […] 

 

Among newly acquired phobias, I would like to single out the fear of live communication (debates, hearings, answers to spontaneous questions), or actually the fear that one can say nonsense or lose the point and make a fool of oneself. […] 

The absurd decision not to go to TV debates before the second round (I say nothing about the first round, because what could the four real candidates discuss with a number of decoy ones?), [… is] a poor mark for the election headquarters and public recognition of their candidate's professional incapacity. I shall not reiterate numerous arguments that debates are one of the basic procedures of democratic elections and that they are not the right of candidates, but their unconditional obligation to voters.

As regards the outcome of Yanukovych's entire election campaign, we never heard a single one of his ideas or positions.

 

The task of the entourage was precisely to make Viktor Yanukovych speak, to make him get rid of his hang-ups and fear of discussions, to teach him to avoid unpleasant topics and to extricate himself from blunders made even by the most venerable politicians and public speakers and, besides this, to avoid the areas in which he really is still out of his depth, like literature, philosophy, or gender problems. The training system is well elaborated for this purpose, and there are perfect national specialists.

 

[Passage omitted: Chornovil describes training needed to perform in TV debates.]

 

Besides this, in addition to everything that has been said above, let me say a few words about anamnesis. I remember Yanukovych coming to debates with Yushchenko before the second and the third rounds in 2004. He might have had some internal fear, but he did not reveal it.

 

It was recognized by both Ukrainian and foreign experts that he had not lost in the debates. Yushchenko was more vivacious and aggressive, while Yanukovych was more constrained. But he was the first to speak and, unlike his opponent, he did not make gross errors. […]

 

It seems to me that the persistent tradition to write full addresses for him, to print them in enormous letters and, besides this, to put stress on them was established when he became prime minister for the second time [August 2006]. Since that time, the texts themselves were gradually becoming cruder, and any kind of [improvisations] […] – more and more inappropriate.

 

Therefore, obvious regression has happened in this sphere as well. But unlike all other complexes of which he is guilty, here we can feel sympathy for Mr. Yanukovych, and it seems to me that those who had reduced him to this condition behaved in an undignified way. […]

 

Tymoshenko, who might have been a normal president, but not the best prime minister, is at the head of the government. In case of Yanukovych's victory, she will continue to [be the] head of the Cabinet of Ministers.

 

As regards Yanukovych, he might have been a brilliant prime minister, but [after] […] the struggle for absolute power, he [is now wasting] effort and energy on senseless confrontation and populism, that is so alien to him.

 

[Passage omitted: more in the same vein.]