16 - 22 September 2003

22 September 2003 The last of nine countries to hold a referendum on joining the European Union voted decisively pro-Europe. Ethnic Russians who didn't get to vote are appealing the results.

RIGA, Latvia--The last in the wave of candidate countries to consider membership in the European Union overwhelming voted ‘yes’ in a referendum on 20 September.

The final vote in Latvia's EU referendum was 67 percent in favor and 32 percent opposed. Turnout was nearly 73 percent--more than double the 35 percent needed to make the referendum binding and higher than in the past parliamentary elections in October 2002. Only Malta had a bigger turnout for its referendum.

The chairman of the Central Voting Commission (CVC), Arnis Cimdars, confirmed the voting results in a press conference on the morning of 21 September. Latvian Prime Minister Einars Repse called the vote one of the three most important events in the country's history, along with Latvia's winning its independence between the two world wars, and regaining it after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. "The third (came) today with the decision to join the European Union," Repse said.

In voting ‘yes’ Latvia takes its place along eight other countries that held EU referendums in 2003--the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Cyprus also is set to join the EU but will not hold a referendum. The EU now is set to expand from 15 to 25 members.

On the night of the referendum, Latvian Television carried a live broadcast of Prime Minister Repse's speech to the Latvian people. “I am thankful to all those voters who took [an] active part in the referendum and helped us realize the aim for which we have [had a long time,] through many years: to return to Europe,” he said. “We voted for security, stability, development, and the future for our children, and for the welfare of the country in general. For the first time in the history of our country, Latvia will become a full-fledged and equal decision-maker in the united Europe, together with Germany, France, United Kingdom, and other member states.”

Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga also thanked Latvian voters for their decision, declaring it the first time “our people have had [a] free opportunity to take active part in determining in which direction we want to see the development of our state and people.” Foreign Affairs Minister Sandra Kalniete commented that “Latvia has irrevocably strengthened its democracy.”

Supporters and congratulations from all over Europe poured in, with EU Enlargement Commissioner saying what many Latvians were eager to hear: “Welcome home, Latvia!”

SHUT OUT

Latvia's sizeable Russian minority--at 644,000, it is almost one-third of the total population--were largely excluded from the vote. Only citizens of Latvia were eligible to weigh in on the question of joining Europe. (Latvia has opened the door for ethnic Russians who arrived during the Soviet-era to apply for citizenship but few have actually applied.)

Before the referendum, concerns ran high among ethnic Russians that EU membership would widen the gulf between Latvia and Russia. With the votes counted, Latvian Socialist Party leader Alfreds Rubiks announced that he will appeal the result to the Constitutional Court, on the basis that he and about half a million non-citizens were discriminated against in the electoral process.

A PUSH FOR 'YES'

Prime Minister Einars Repse's Management Group started campaigning for a win on 5 May and didn't stop trying to convince people that Europe was the future until the day before the vote, 19 September. Formed by Repse to disseminate information and promote public discussion on EU membership, the group's task force was led by music academy professor Ramona Umblija.

In the last weeks before the referendum, the group launched an advertising campaign on television, radio, and in the print media. With the slogan, “Don’t stay aside!” it targeted three main audiences: farmers, workers and pensioners. The Latvian government allocated approximately 1.5 million euro ($1.7 million) for the campaign, which ended with an evening musical performance in Riga's Dome Square.

When asked by TOL to assess the effectiveness of the campaign, Umblija said she had found that the more information a person received, the more likely they were to vote 'yes.' Did the campaign have weak points? The ad campaign could have been more visible, she said, but its success was never in doubt.

ON THE WORLD STAGE

On the day of the referendum, a large crowd of foreign press turned up to cover the voting. Inevitably, some politicians could not resist the chance to speak out.

With only 25 percent of voting stations closed, Latvian First Party chairman Eriks Jekabsons declared to reporters that “Latvia [was] on the breach of dictatorship and that the only possibility to save the country is to change … Prime Minister Einars Repse.” That comment angered several listening politicians and a three-hour debate followed on just who had stabbed whom in the back. In the aftermath, Foreign Affairs Minister Sandra Kalniete commented to the press that the fact that a “national celebration can be spoilt in such a way shows that some [people] just do not have a sense of proportion.”

After the various factions finished celebrating and bickering, reality set in fairly quickly. President Vaira Vike-Freiberga reminded Latvians and her colleagues in government that “the framework of [the] EU is not a rose garden or milk and honey. It is a household of grown-up and mature democratic nations, where practical work needs to be done, where each nation defends its interests, and where each has to work to be competitive.” She added, “We now have to go back to all the concrete daily tasks and continue to carry out the engagements that we have taken in the agreement signed in Athens [2003].”

During its accession talks, Latvia agreed to abide by 35 transition periods in areas such as agriculture and fisheries, transport policy, tax policy, social policy and employment, environment, and energy. For example, the current EU member states asked for, and received, a transition period of up to seven years before free movement of labor is allowed, with a caveat that the issue be revisited after a few years.

Widespread fears among Latvians--during negotiations--that foreigners would rush in and buy up all the land were quelled by a mandated transition period of seven years, when only Latvians will be able to become owners of Latvian land. Enterprises that aren't registered in Latvia will not be able to buy land, and if an EU citizen wants to buy Latvian land, he will have to live in the country for three consecutive years first.

As for the economic consequences of joining the EU, Eriks Plato, Deputy Director of Nordea Bank Latvia branch, told TOL that the European Central Bank has already declared 1 January 2005 as the date when the Latvian lat will be attached to the euro. For technical reasons, he said, it is not possible to switch to the euro before 1 May 2007. (None of the new member states will vote on whether to join the euro; their approval of EU membership means they accept the EU's currency.)

The next political battle will be the selection of the final roster of representatives to the European Parliament. Several places will have to be filled: one commissioner, rotating judges for the European courts, seven people for the Economic and Social Committee, and seven for the Committee of Regions.

A RANGE OF REACTIONS

A sampling of ordinary people in Latvia reveals a range of opinions on the results that track along ethnic, religious, and economic lines.

Maris Noviks, of the European Movement in Latvia, said he was “very pleased with the results" since he had played a role in encouraging a ‘yes’ vote.

Juris Birznieks, head of the board of directors of the School of Business Administration Turiba, said by voting ‘yes,’ Latvians have given up a chance “to keep the reins of control in their hands.”

The poet Mara Zalite--whose call for a ‘yes’ vote was signed by 248 well-known members of society--reminded people that future successes “will depend on the state administrative capacity and on people; how much they will understand that they themselves have to move, work, and think actively and creatively.”

A member of an international youth organization named Jura--a Russian speaking non-citizen--said he would have voted ‘no’ if he could “because Latvia is not up to Europe’s standards, and that will cause instability.”

Guntis Gutmanis, of A People’s Party, said EU membership will give him“[a] greater possibility of receiving a bigger pension and a better life.”

But Pauls Stelps said he fears that membership in the EU will force amorality on Latvia. “If Christian faith says that we shall see the tree by its fruit," he said, "then looking at the changes in EU countries, we see great putridity.”

Related Articles:

Opinion: Running From a Wolf
On the eve of their EU referendum, why are Latvians still such euroskeptics?
by Dace Akule
18 September 2003

News: Seven Down, One to Go
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For more articles on Latvia, visit our Latvia country file, at http://latvia.tol.cz.

Chechnya: A Political Mopping-Up Operation?
Chechen presidential election becomes a one-man race after the Kremlin and the courts intervene.

MOSCOW, Russia--Chechnya’s presidential elections, scheduled for 5 October, now appear a foregone conclusion after three frontrunners abandoned the race. After clearing a legal challenge himself, the acting head of the pro-Kremlin administration in the breakaway republic, Akhmad Kadyrov, now appears to have a clear run to victory ahead of him.

The election campaign began with little fanfare in August. Kadyrov also seemed to have pulled off what analyst Nabi Abdullaev described as a “masterstroke” when he sacked and then re-appointed his ministers. The move appeared to assure him of his ministers support in his election campaign, while “the lack of response by the Kremlin” indicated that “either through choice or forced by Kadyrov’s brilliance” Moscow had made up its mind to support Kadyrov, Abdullaev wrote.

At the time, it also seemed that there would be few viable alternatives to Kadyrov. Ruslan Khasbulatov, the most popular Chechen politician and the former speaker of the Russian Duma, pulled out in July. According to a poll by Validata, support for him was running at 25.7 percent in June. Khasbulatov explained his decision on the grounds that it is impossible to hold “honest elections in Chechnya" at present.

Perceptions began to change, however, when Aslanbek Aslakhanov, Hussein Dzabrailov, and Malik Saidullaev threw their hats into the race. Each is a prominent figure. Aslakhanov is the only Chechen deputy in the Duma. Dzhabrailov comes from a wealthy family, while Saidullaev, a Chechen businessman based in Moscow, is said to be influential.

All three were seen as more popular than Kadyrov. June’s Validata poll showed Kadyrov enjoyed 13.1 percent support, compared with Saidullaev, who had 23.3 percent support, and Aslakhanov with 22.4 percent.

With opposition to Kadyrov growing, both Kadyrov and the Kremlin swung into action in what the liberal newspaper Novye Izvestiya called a “mopping-up operation," a reference to the Russian military’s brutal and much-criticized military operations in Chechen villages. Kadyrov sacked his media minister, Bislan Gantamirov, a supporter of Dzabrailov, merged the ministry with the Nationalities Ministry, and put the head of his campaign charge at the head of the ministry. Members of his security force then occupied Chechnya's only television station and the offices of all newspapers in Chechnya.

The Kremlin did not criticize Kadyrov. Instead, it called in two candidates for private talks. They both emerged to say they were withdrawing from the race.

On 2 September, the head of the Presidential Administration Alexander Voloshin met Dzabrailov, who emerged to say that he could better improve “dialogue among Chechens” by not standing for the presidency.

On 11 September, Aslakhanov also called it quits. This was a radical about-face. On 3 September, he had declared: “There are only three factors that may make me withdraw my candidacy: a blow to the brain; my removal from the pre-election race (any formal reason can be found for this purpose); and if conditions necessary for democratic elections are not met. I won’t participate in a farce.”

In the end, an offer to become an advisor to President Vladimir Putin provided a fourth and decisive reason.

Ella Pamfilova, the chairwoman of the Presidential Commission for Human Rights, said she was “puzzled” by Aslakhanov’s decision, saying he is “a person who wouldn’t bargain about politics.” In earlier conversations with her, he had told her “he wouldn’t withdraw from the pre-election race under any circumstances.”

Both Djabrailov and Aslakhanov insisted they made their decisions voluntarily. Aslakhanov told the radio station Ekho Moskvy that “no pressure was exerted upon me while I was making a decision to accept the president’s appointment.”

Enticement may have done the trick in these two instances, but in Saidullaev’s case, force rather than enticement was needed. A campaign aide of Saidullaev told the Moscow Times that Saidullaev "had been contacted with offers of government posts and business deals in exchange for dropping his bid, but he had refused."

Saidullaev was officially forced out of the race by the Chechen Supreme Court, which ruled on 11 September that up to 40 percent of the signatures gathered to support Saidullaev’s candidacy had been forged.

But Kadyrov survived a court case on 16 September, when a Moscow court said that it was within the law for Kadyrov to appear on television alongside President Vladimir Putin.

Under a strict new law introduced ahead of the election season--parliamentary elections will be held in December and presidential elections in March--media outlets face closure if they disclose details of candidates' personal lives, carry forecasts of results, and do not provide equal coverage of the parties. Officials must not use their posts to promote parties.

Some interpret Putin’s appearance alongside Kadyrov as endorsement. Putin openly declared his support for the United Russia party on 21 September.

THE ROADMAP TO (DIS)ORDER

With no serious contenders left, Kadyrov’s election now seems a certainty.

This would bring Kadyrov to the end of the “roadmap” to order in Chechnya. The roadmap had three stages: a referendum to adopt a new constitution, an amnesty for Chechen rebels, and presidential elections. The referendum was passed with questionable ease in March (96 percent of Chechens voted and 80 percent voted in favor of a new constitution), then Putin declared an amnesty for Chechen rebels to hand in their weapons. The amnesty ended on 1 September.

The broader question, though, is whether the results of the elections will be accepted, as the legitimacy of Kadyrov’s presidential mandate is already being called in to question--even before his election.

Disgruntled supporters of Aslakhanov, Dzabrailov, and Saidullaev could reject the outcome, and Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the Center of Strategic Studies, told Rossiiskaya Gazeta that “the election of Kadyrov might mark the point of a final break between the Chechen population and Moscow," bringing even more disorder to the troubled republic.

If so, Putin may find that the attempt to legitimize Akhmad Kadyrov as the head of the republic could potentially hinder, rather than boost, Putin’s bid for re-election. Putin has promised to put an end to terrorism in Russia and to the Chechen insurgency.


Related Articles:

Caucasus Diary: A Chechen Revolution
How sacking all your ministers and then reappointing (nearly) all of them can be a masterstroke.
by Nabi Abdullaev
18 June 2003

Caucasus Diaries: Chechnya’s Grim Choice
The Chechen referendum was a choice between having a state of some kind or having no state. Better a state led by puppets than none at all.
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26 March 2003

News: An End to Separatism?
Chechens vote in massive numbers to drop separatist ambitions, voting for a new constitution that would relegate Chechnya to an autonomous republic.
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Notes from Grozny: A Potted Road to Normality
Life for Chechen refugees is inching back towards normality. It could be much more normal.
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27 March 2003

Caucasus Diary: Suicide--or Staged--Bombings?
History suggests Chechens were not behind the recent Moscow bomb blasts.
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16 July 2003

Serbia: Toying with Elections, Again
After two failed attempts to elect a president last year, Serbia’s acting president calls new elections for November, but the most popular reformers refuse to play ball.

BELGRADE, Serbia and Montenegro—When Serbia's acting President Natasa Micic called presidential elections for 16 November, analysts immediately predicted their failure due to voter turnout requirements and an announced boycott by the popular reformist opposition.

It will be the fourth time in one year that Serbia will go to the polls to elect a new president. In September, October, and December 2002, the country unsuccessfully attempted to elect a head of state. Then-Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica won twice just to see his victories voided due a low voter turnout of about 45 percent, below the 50 percent required by the electoral law.

Analysts expect the 16 November elections to end in yet another failure.

Micic, who is also speaker of parliament, previously vowed to call presidential elections after the adoption of a new Serbian constitution to replace the one that has existed since the rule of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, who was ousted in October 2000. The new constitution was scheduled to be drafted by the end of September, but political quarrelling has halted its progress.

FOURTH TIME LUCKY?

During a 17 September press conference, Micic said that enough is enough and the public deserves a president.

“In February, when I announced my decision [to put off the election], I clearly stated that if the new Serbian constitution is not adopted on time, it will be necessary to test the popular will in a presidential election,” Micic said.

“This test will now be more important than the risk that the election might fail. Seven months later, because of all that we have gone through in the meantime, I am even more convinced of the need that we all try to do our best so that Serbia, if it could not get a new constitution, gets an elected president,” she said.

The failure of the previous polls was in large part due to a tacit boycott by the ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition, which rather mildly supported its candidate, Miroljub Labus--then Yugoslav deputy prime minister--in an effort to lower the turnout and prevent its arch enemy, Kostunica, from taking the post.

The lack of true support by DOS irritated Labus, who then officially stepped down from the Democratic Party (DS), the coalition’s main party. Labus immediately began to work on the creation of G17 Plus, a new political party comprising the G17 group of independent economists, who masterminded the economic reforms in Serbia since the ouster of Milosevic.

A year later, Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and Labus’ G17 Plus are Serbia’s most popular parties, according to opinion polls. But the two leaders of Serbia’s reformist opposition have refused to participate in November's presidential vote.

Kostunica and Labus both argue that the election will be a waste of time and money--around 5 million euros--because of the existing voter turnout requirement.

Furthermore, they say, even if the elections somehow succeed, the new president will likely step down from office as early as next year, when a new Serbian constitution is scheduled to be adopted.

Kostunica told the daily Kurir that “DOS is not aware of the seriousness of the crisis, and for them, presidential elections are just a way to help them stay in power a bit longer.”

A NEW PARLIAMENT, NOT A NEW PRESIDENT

Parliamentary elections are what Serbia really needs at this point, says DSS Vice President Dragan Marsicanin.

“DSS had been warning for a long time that in order to resolve the political crisis, early parliamentary elections must be called. The only goal of presidential elections is to postpone the parliamentary ones,” Marsicanin told the daily Blic.

“The only one opposed to parliamentary elections is the interest group that is afraid of losing its grip on power and calls itself the government of Serbia,” he said.

“This election is a farce. It will not resolve anything and will not end the bad work done by government,” Mladjan Dinkic, the recently sacked governor of the Serbian National Bank and deputy president of G17 Plus, said in a televised interview.

Nenad Konstantinovic, one of the leaders of the non-governmental movement Otpor, told Kurir that the call for elections “was completely insincere, with the aim to see them fail.”

The opposition Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), led by Vuk Draskovic, also called for the boycott of elections.

The only opposition party to agree to participate in the 16 November election is the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), led by ultranationalist Vojislav Seselj, who is currently awaiting trial for war crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague.

The ruling DOS coalition has put forward several names for potential candidates. The two most serious are Defense Minister Boris Tadic and the president of Serbia and Montenegro's parliament, Dragoljub Micunovic.

Tadic, however, has said he prefers to keep his current post and pursue reforms in the defense sector.

Micunovic, head of the Democratic Center (DC), a small party within the coalition, is a veteran politician and a communist-era dissident who is seen as a moderate. Micunovic had formed DS with Kostunica and Zoran Djindjic in 1989.

In the early 1990s, both Kostunica and Micunovic left DS after bitter disputes with Djindjic, who remained the absolute leader of the party until he was assassinated as Serbian prime minister on 12 March.

But even the coalition parties have failed to reach a consensus on the necessity of holding elections. Justice Minister Vladan Batic said elections would be “a waste of money and time” and were “completely senseless.” Several other DOS leaders echoed his sentiments.

WAITING FOR THE BIG GUNS

Ljiljana Bacevic of the Belgrade Institute of Social Sciences says elections have no chance of succeeding if Kostunica and Labus do not show up as candidates.

James Lyon, coordinator of Belgrade’s International Crisis Group--a Brussels-based think tank--told RFE/RL that Labus and Kostunica’s refusal to participate in elections could be a simple case of political maneuvering.

“Let's not forget that Kostunica during the past presidential election said he wouldn't run, and he waited until the very last moment, until the very last day, to announce his candidacy,” Lyon said.

Srdjan Bogosavljevic of the Strategic Marketing polling agency says elections “could have a chance to succeed only if all four main political formations participate: DSS, G17 Plus, DS, and SRS.”

Strategic Marketing polls credit DSS with 20 percent of the vote, ahead of G17 Plus with 16 percent, DS with 15 percent, and SRS with 8 percent.

In response to suggestions that the calling of presidential elections is an attempt to divert he public’s attention away from the country’s pressing problems, RFE/RL quoted Lyon as saying: “This is possibly one way of hoping to defuse some of the tensions that have arisen over a number of the recent political corruption scandals and over some of the scandals involving the parliament and lack of a quorum when some votes were taken.”


Related Stories:

BRR News: Serbia’s Popular Reformers Split
A feud over the Central Bank turns top reformers into bitter enemies as an economic clash becomes political.
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BRR News: Assassination Launches Serbia Forward
The investigation into the prime minister’s murder has earned Serbia new respect, Council of Europe membership, and promises of U.S. aid.
7 April 2003

BRR News: No Presidential Pulse
For the third time, the Serbian public fails to show up at the polls, making repeat presidential elections once again null and void.
10 December 2002

For more articles on the Balkans, visit our Balkan page, at http://balkanreport.tol.cz.


Bosnia: Clinton’s Tears Over Srebrenica
In front of tens of thousands of mourners, the former U.S. president condemns the 1995 massacre and admonishes the “bad people who lusted for power.”

SARAJEVO, Bosnia and Herzegovina--Former U.S. President Bill Clinton joined nearly 30,000 people, most of them survivors of Europe's worst massacre since World War II, in Srebrenica on 20 September for the unveiling of the Potocari memorial center dedicated to the thousands of Bosnian Muslims killed between 11 and 14 July 1995.

After the opening speeches, 107 victims, exhumed from mass graves, were buried in the cemetery that surrounds the memorial center. Since July, 881 bodes have been buried here, and, of them, four were under 18 years old, while the oldest victim was 75.

“Srebrenica shattered the illusion that the end of the Cold War would sweep away such madness. Instead, it laid bare for all the world to see the vulnerability of ordinary people to the dark claims of religion and ethnic superiority,” Clinton said in his speech to the mourners, mostly Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) women who lost their husbands and sons in the tragedy.

“Bad people who lusted for power killed those good people simply because of who they were,” Clinton said. “They sought power through genocide.”

The memorial center is located directly across from the factory that served as United Nations headquarters in Srebrenica at the time of the massacre. After the town fell to Bosnian Serb Army forces under the command of General Ratko Mladic on 11 July 1995, all civilians sought protection in the UN base in Potocari, several miles outside of Srebrenica. There, the Bosnian-Serb Army separated men from women.

With UN peacekeepers helplessly looking on, between 7,000 and 8,000 men and boys were rounded up, taken away, and later executed over a period of several days.

Mladic and wartime Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic have been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague for genocide in Srebrenica and other war crimes. Both are still at large.

”Those most responsible for the atrocities, the leaders, have not been apprehended. The search for them must continue until they are,” Clinton said.

So far, the Commission for Missing Persons in the Bosniak- and Bosnian-Croat- dominated Federation entity has uncovered approximately 50 mass graves containing the bodies of victims of the Srebrenica massacre. Officials are uncertain how many more mass graves exist.

Local police, the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), and 300 civilians provided security for the memorial’s opening ceremony, while four U.S. Apache helicopters patrolled the airspace over Potocari.
Survivors burying their loved ones were given the chance to address the crowds.

Ramiz Dzafic was only six months old when Bosnian Serb soldiers pulled his father and uncle from a bus heading out of Srebrenica and executed them.

“I wish that my father was still alive, so my grandmother could stop crying,” the now 9-year-old Dzafic told the crowds gathered in Potocari. “His funeral today won’t help me, because I still won’t know what he looked like. But my grandmother and aunts tell me he was beautiful, like a movie star,” he said.

Mevludin Omerovic buried his brother, Sahman, on 20 September. It was the second brother he had buried this year.

“I am all alone now. I am still searching for one more brother who is still buried in some mass grave around Srebrenica,” Omerovic said.

CHOOSING CLINTON

Though Clinton was warmly welcomed in Potocari, the announcement of his plans to visit Srebrenica earlier this year did involve discussion here as to whether the former U.S. president has the moral right to unveil the memorial.

Some survivors from Srebrenica feel that the West, including Clinton, did nothing to stop the killings in Bosnia.

Sulejman Tihic, a member of Bosnia’s rotating, tripartite presidency and leader of the Bosniak nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA), said in Potocari on 20 September that for almost four years the world was sitting back and watching what was going on in Bosnia.

“Everybody knew about the concentration camps, genocide, and other crimes. They knew who was participating in it. They knew who the criminals were and who the victims were,” Tihic said in his speech, broadcast live on national television.

But others, including many survivors, felt that Clinton’s unveiling of the new memorial center was appropriate because of the former U.S. president’s personal efforts to bring an end to the 1992-1995 war.

The United States’ resolve to step up efforts to end the war wavered throughout, with the Clinton Administration pushing for air strikes against the Bosnian-Serb Army, but at the same time largely against lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government, despite congressional calls to do so. Still, continued U.S. calls to use punitive air power against the Bosnian Serbs, while the United Nations and European community called for diplomacy, scored the former Arkansas governor a few points in Bosnia.

Earlier this year, the Dutch Parliament accused former UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Commander Bernard Janvier of being responsible for the Srebrenica tragedy. According to the report, Janvier failed to approve NATO air strikes against the advancing Bosnian-Serb army, although he was aware of its plans.

Munira Subasic, President of the Mothers of Srebrenica association, said that she and other members of her association met with Clinton privately in Potocari before the opening ceremony to ask him if he could have prevented the massacre.

“Clinton said there was nothing he could do to stop it because there was always someone who was slowing down the process of Western intervention, and I believe him. I think he is an honest man,” Subasic told TOL in a 22 September telephone interview.

Subasic said that Clinton was crying after he heard the testimonies of the women and children who survived the massacres, and said that though he couldn’t help the victims, he would do everything in his power to help the survivors.

SREBRENICA’S PURGATORY

So far, only half of those missing from Srebrenica have been exhumed from mass graves. In warehouses in Visoko and Tuzla, some 4,500 exhumed bodies are still waiting to be identified and properly buried.

The Potocari memorial-cemetery complex cost a total of $5.8 million. The U.S. government donated $1 million last year and the rest of the funds came from private donations.

The complex consists of burial fields plotted around a central area that features an open-air prayer room, a crypt with a garden, and a memorial room.

Though the ceremony was conducted without a hitch, five days before, the association of concentration camp survivors of Republika Srpska announced that on 19 September it would erect a statue on the grounds of a former Bosnian Army barracks in Sarajevo. The statue is in memory of thousands of Bosnian Serbs the association says were killed in the barracks--a claim former Bosnian Army officials deny.

Federation authorities refused the association’s request, on the grounds that the place is now the site of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When protesters showed up at the court house, police refused them entrance, and they returned to Republika Srpska.

Republika Srpska Prime Minister Dragan Mikerevic was the only Bosnian-Serb official to attend the opening ceremony. Mikerevic told local media gathered in Srebrenica that it was his obligation to attend and that he hopes for “peace and reconciliation.” During the earlier burial ceremony in March, Mikerevic publicly admitted that “crimes were clearly committed” in Srebrenica but stopped short of admitting Bosnian-Serb responsibility.

Before coming to Potocari, Clinton had visited Kosovo on 19 September, where he was applauded by Kosovo Albanians for his role in NATO’s 1999 bombing of Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, which resulted in the expelling of Serb forces from the now UN-administered province.


Related Stories:

BRR News: Reconciliation Reburial?
Bosnian Serb authorities pay respects at the eighth anniversary commemorations of the Srebrenica massacre.
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BRR News: Owning Up to Srebrenica
A Bosnian Serb Army officer pleads guilty to war crimes in Srebrenica and strikes a deal to testify against his colleagues.
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BRR News: The Flip Side
The first Bosnian Muslim accused of war crimes in Srebrenica is arrested and transferred to the Hague.
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BRR News: A Final Farewell
Survivors of the Srebrenica massacre find some closure as the bodies of 600 Bosniaks are finally given a proper burial.
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BRR News: Mission Impossible?
The Dutch parliament accuses former UNPROFOR commander Bernard Janvier of being responsible for the Srebrenica tragedy in Bosnia.
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Poland: A History of War, A War over History
German group adamant it will build a memorial in Berlin to postwar deportees in the face of domestic and Polish resistance.

WARSAW, Poland--The chief backer of a proposed center for German post-World War II expellees finally took her views to the lion's den.

On 16 September, German parliamentarian Erika Steinbach, head of the Bund der Vertriebenen (Federation for Expellees), which represents survivors and descendants of the Germans deported from Central and Eastern Europe, came to Warsaw to confront her Polish opponents in public debate.

The debate, organized by the daily Rzeczpospolita and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, brought together members of the Polish and German parliaments, journalists, diplomats, and analysts in Warsaw to discuss the controversial proposal to set up a memorial center in Berlin dedicated to the memory of the millions of postwar German expellees, whose numbers are generally estimated at some 12 million.

During the discussion, Steinbach was unbending, declaring that if the German government gave her no support or funds for the Center Against Expulsions she would build it with the help of private citizens.

Steinbach said opposition would not make her “hang” her plans to create the center in Berlin. In addition to expellees' groups, the plans are backed mainly by Steinbach's opposition Christian Democrats and the Liberals of the FDP. Some supporters believe the center could open its doors in 2005--the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II and the start of the mass deportations of Germans.

Steinbach's visit may not have aroused much sympathy for a center against expulsions sited in Berlin, but it did succeed to bring Poles from different political and social groups together in opposition to the Berlin memorial.

In spite of Steinbach's statements that she had no intention of trying to change the historical record and had thought long and hard to avoid harming the feelings of Germany's neighbors regarding the war and its aftermath, she found little, if any, support from the Polish side of the debate.

Heniq Tefes, director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's Warsaw office, used wordplay to make his point that Germans and Poles were still miles apart. He told Germany's influential weekly Die Zeit, “Noch ist Polen nicht verstanden” (“Poland has not yet been understood”), a paraphrase of the first words of the German version of Poland's national anthem: “Noch is Polen nicht verloren” (“Poland is not yet lost”).

Donald Tusk, a parliamentarian from the symbol-laden region of Gdansk, vice speaker of the Sejm and chief of the liberal Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) party, said Steinbach’s proposal was very dangerous for Polish-German reconciliation and future relations between both countries.

On 20 September, Tusk’s party asked the Sejm to back its proposal to create a "memorial center of the European nations" in Warsaw, under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Civic Platform argued that Poland's capital was appropriate for such a center because of its experience with two totalitarian systems, Nazism and Communism.

The deputy chief of the ruling Social Democrats (SLD) suggested that Steinbach's aim was to "erase one historical dimension of the expulsions.” Jozef Oleksy also told the debate audience that German public opinion was divided over the proposed center. Leading German politicians, including Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, have expressed doubts about the Federation for Expellees' proposal. German President Johannes Rau earlier had discussed setting up a European-wide center for expelled people with his Polish counterpart, Aleksander Kwasniewski.

Two weeks before Steinbach's trip to Poland, Kwasniewski said he understood the German expellees' request for "some kind of compensation, at least in terms of memory," but on condition that "we shall not forget who started the war and who is responsible for the killing, the tragedies, the Holocaust."

On 22 September, Prime Minister Leszek Miller was due to meet Schroeder in Gelsenkirchen to discuss several aspects of Polish-German relations. There is little doubt that the Center Against Expulsions will loom large in the talks.

HONOR THE EXPELLEES, BUT NOT IN BERLIN

On the sidelines of the ongoing debate over Polish-German relations and the postwar deportation, the Polish magazine Wprost set off a minor storm with its cover illustration showing Steinbach clad in Nazi uniform astride a kneeling Gerhard Schroeder. The weekly, known for its sometimes scandalous covers, headlined the story "German Trojan Horse: Germans owe Poles 1 trillion dollars for World War II."

Justifying the subheading, Wprost cited former Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, who was a prisoner at the Auschwitz concentration camp, saying that if Steinbach and her supporters put forward demands for compensation for property seized by Poland from Germans after the war, Poland could present a counter-demand for reparations "that several generations of Germans won’t be able to pay."

In the two years since the Bundestag approved payments to Poles forced into slave labor during the war, the Polish-German Foundation for Reconciliation has disbursed 2.1 billion zlotys (about $530 million) to 431,000 people--not without some hitches, notably over the rate of exchange that favored Germany at the expense of the former slave laborers.

There was little reaction to the article in Poland until the German press took note. Following critical coverage by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, ARD television and other media, Miller denounced the cover as "tasteless," and told the weekly Welt am Sonntag that he personally deplored the image, adding that he did not believe the discussion over the expellee center would disturb Polish-German relations.

In the wake of the Federation for Expellees' proposal to locate the center in Berlin, a number of alternative sites have been proposed.

In 2002, Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, and Adam Krzeminski, a commentator with the weekly Polityka adopted German Social Democrat parliamentarian Markus Meckel's counter-proposal of Wroclaw (the former German city of Breslau) as a more appropriate site.

Former Foreign Minister Bartoszewski suggested a "center documenting the history of the 'Germanization' of Poland," for Poznan, another western Polish city with deep German roots, the Warsaw Voice reported--while the mayor of Goerlitz suggested the town on the Polish border would be a suitable spot as well, provided the institution would have a "European character."


Diversity: Old Foes Face Off Over Expulsion Memorial
Should a memorial dedicated to millions of Germans forcibly expelled from their homes after World War II be established? And if so, where?
by TOL
6 August 2003

News: Czechs, Germans Again at Loggerheads Over Postwar Expulsions
1 - 7 July 2003

News: Eastern Europeans Reassured by Schroeder
28 August - 3 September 2000

Interested in Poland? Visit the TOL Poland page at http://poland.tol.cz.

Chubais Spells out Napoleonic Vision for Russian Energy

ULYANOVSK, Russia--It was likely to be a week for grand visions, with the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan meeting in Yalta to take a further step toward establishing a “two-speed” Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The four will, they said, create a “united economic space” in which tariffs would be unified and the flow of labor and capital made easier.

But if anything, that ambition was eclipsed by the vision outlined by Unified Energy Systems (UES), Russia’s monopoly electricity generator and distributor. In the Yalta summit, there were already signs of reluctance, with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma making it plain that the CIS was a second choice. "Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow," he commented, after saying that "the European market is closed for us."

The statements of the head of UES, Anatoly Chubais, sounded much more upbeat, when he, consciously or unconsciously, echoed the presidents’ statements by unveiling an “aggressive” plan “to restore a single energy space on the territory of the CIS.” UES plans are grander still, involving expansion into at least 16 former Soviet republics and satellite states, as well as Germany, Turkey, and Japan.

Chubais’s confident stride across the international stage, which duly earned him ironic headlines, such as “Chubais conquers Europe,” also has a political dimension. Since Chubais is also the third most senior figure in the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and parliamentary elections are less than three months away, his plans could potentially help increase his public profile and impress voters.

Alternatively, facing another winter of possible blackouts and cold, Russians might be irritated rather than impressed by Chubais’s ambitions.

CHUBAIS’S STRATEGY

Chubais indicated to journalists that he had been planning a similar expansion since he took over at UES. He said that he had recognized then that the company needed a multistage strategy. The strategy has now been developed.

UES has long been a major (frequently dominant) supplier to other countries in the region. It now wants to supply electricity directly to end-users, rather than selling electricity wholesale to foreign energy companies.

Its subsidiaries would “act both as retail resellers of Russian electricity and as organizers of electricity supplies to third countries to which, because of high transit tariffs, it would be inefficient to export to directly from Russia,” a company official said.

“Russian energy occupies a leading position in the CIS,” Chubais said. In August, UES bought Georgia's largest power plant and critical parts of the national transmission grid.

The next stage of the plan is to buy generators and distribution systems in Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

His deputy, Andrei Rappoport, told journalists that UES has "far-reaching plans" to launch bids within a year for energy assets in Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria.

Other assets would be bought on long-term lease. UES is, he said, looking into the possibility of long-term leases to buy transmission lines linking Armenia with Georgia, Iran and Turkey, and looking into getting a lease on Berezovskaya TPP, which currently supplies power to Poland.

As part of a longer-term project, UES also plans to supply Japan with electricity generated on the island of Sakhalin. The electricity would be sent by an underwater cable. This would, though, require massive investment, totaling nearly $10 billion, the company indicated.

While UES sees itself as the heart that will pump power to the CIS, it has also taken steps to ensure it has secondary supplies. In August, UES launched a project that would enable it to import electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the two main producers of electricity in Central Asia.

WHAT ABOUT LIGHTING RUSSIA?

UES’s top managers failed to supply many details, and the stock market’s calm reaction indicated that UES’s plans to supply power to almost all of Eurasia had sparked neither excitement nor fear.

Ultimately, the market may prove critical to UES’s ambitions, as this acquisition spree would require large loans. UES clearly believes that improved collection rates and a surge in investors’ confidence in the company will mean it can raise the large sums needed.

Skepticism was clear, though, in the analysis of Hartmut Yakob, an analyst with the investment company Renaissance Capital. He told the business daily Finansovye Izvestia that this is not the right moment to take on problems on such a scale. “It diverts the leadership UES from reform, and plants the thought in investors’ minds that the power holding is helping the Kremlin increase its influence on CIS countries.”

It is reform of the Russian energy system that particularly concerns most Russians. “Why do we need all these assets if we don’t have elementary services such as hot water and heating in our own country?” was a typical response on the streets of Ulyanovsk, the birthplace of Lenin.

Lenin famously said that "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country." For many Russians, however, the centralized system that the Soviets developed has regularly been a source of darkness rather than light in post-Soviet times. Chubais’s words therefore caused some Russians nothing but irritation.

As many plants and factories went bankrupt, they failed to pay for electricity. UES’s most effective means of getting payments has been to cut power supplies to late-paying factories.

The side-effect has been to cut the electricity to trams and trolley-buses as public services are usually on the same electricity lines as factories.

The approach has, if anything, been even more ruthless in villages, where UES employees have arrived to disconnect lines because of late payment. This has left villages even poorer and more isolated.

UES has even cut power supplies to military units and installations--because even the Defense Ministry fails to pay for electricity on time.

This prompted the Oleg Mironov, the then-ombudsman of the electricity sector, to call the power cuts “a disgrace” and a threat to national security.

UES is currently embroiled in legal cases around the country, after a court in Krasnoyarsk ruled in July 2002 that UES was wrongly calculating the prices that publicly funded organizations had to pay. The case set a precedent, prompting lawyers to challenge many disconnections.

In the long term, prices rise. Speaking to the U.S.-based magazine Business Week in May 2002, Chubais said “we will definitely have to raise the price.”

“Energy in Russia costs more than people pay now,” he said. “People won't learn to use resources properly if they pay nothing. ... The average family in Russia now pays 60 rubles per month for electricity. That's equivalent to one bottle of vodka. By 2004, that amount should be doubled--two bottles of vodka.”

Prices have risen since then. Though many Russians say prices are too high, the greatest cause of unhappiness is arguably the failure to supply basic services. UES is supposed to deliver hot water, as well as electricity. The system, however, frequently breaks down in winter, or municipal authorities, who collect electricity bills from households, fail to pay UES. “We pay for services, but where are they,” people ask.

(This also means that Chubais is getting additional “bottles of vodka”: when hot-water supply fails, households turn to electric water-heaters, a much costly source of energy.)

Chubais’s elevation to third in the list of SPS candidates for the Duma and his aggressive expansion plans may, therefore, heighten his public profile, but it may not make him a more popular man.

This may not be a political concern for Chubais. His most immediate political goal is to help the SPS to garner the 5 percent of votes needed to win a place in parliament. At the moment, he appears to be helping. His personal ratings are more than the combined figures for the two joint leaders of the SPS, Boris Nemtsov and Irina Khakamada.


Related Articles:

News: Two-Speed CIS Emerges
by Rashid Dyussembaev
25 February – 3 March 2003

For more on Russia, visit our Russia country file, at http://russia.tol.cz.

Macedonian Students Protest at Desegregation

SKOPJE, Macedonia--In a repeat of last September, student segregation problems have again postponed the start of the school year in Macedonia, as ethnically colored politics in the capital of Skopje and the southern town of Bitola cause massive protests against desegregation attempts.

This year’s problems arose as a result of a decision by Macedonian Education Minister Azis Polozani to open an Albanian-language high-school class for ethnic Albanian students, from the Albanian-dominated town of Kicevo, in a Bitola elementary school.

The school’s management and the students’ parents, as well as the general public in Bitola, were enraged at the decision, citing the fact that ethnic Albanians in Bitola account for only 1 percent of the population. They also protested the idea of housing high-school and elementary-school children in one building.

Ethnic Macedonian parents in Bitola refused to allow their children to attend classes, and on 9 September they took to the streets in protest.

“By opening this outpost class, Minister Polozani in fact wishes to establish by the back door a whole Albanian-language comprehensive school in Bitola,” said one member of the Macedonian parental board protesting outside the school.

Nearby, members of the Bitola branch of the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (BDI)--a member of the government--awaited the opening ceremony of the Albanian-language high-school class, with police and international community representatives standing by to intervene if incidents arose.

The protests forced the Albanian class to move to another building, which also houses the local headquarters of BDI and the Democratic Party of Albanians (PDSh). But the protests continued, as 1,000 Macedonian high-school students hit the streets to demand that the “imported ethnic Albanian students” be immediately returned to Kicevo.

On 15 September, the Macedonian government put Minister Polozani’s decision on hold indefinitely, promising talks to provide a solution to appease both sides. But students were not appeased.

The Albanian-language classes continued in the heavily guarded building to which they were relocated, as student protests intensified in Bitola.

On 16 September, ethnic Macedonian students boycotted all classes, while local residents launched a petition to reverse Polozani’s decision, and protest leaders held a press conference, laying out the arguments for resistance.

“In both of the Bitola elementary schools, only 11 Albanian students are eligible to enroll in high school. We wish no support from the political parties, but support from the state and those responsible to see that laws are being (respected),” said Ilco Dimovski, president of the Student Coordination Body.

“There are no conditions in Bitola for implementation of the Ohrid framework agreement because the Albanians account for a mere 1 percent, not 20 percent,” Dimovski explained.

The Ohrid agreement--the internationally brokered peace deal that ended the 2001 ethnic conflict--grants ethnic Albanians the right to use the Albanian language as a second official language in places where they account for 20 percent of the population or more.

Local branches of the ethnic Macedonian political parties--the ruling Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the opposition Internal Revolutionary Macedonian Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) --also entered the arena, holding press conferences on the issue.

SDSM and LDP condemned the protests and what it called the political abuse of children, while the opposition countered the Education Ministry’s decision.

In the meantime, ethnic Albanians are insisting that the students in question are not “imported.”

“In June this year, 32 ethnic Albanians finished their elementary education in Bitola,” said Evdal Akifi Roci, a member of the ethnic Albanian parental board and a member of the BDI.

And there are many others, he says, from the nearby villages. “But fully observing the criteria of the Education Ministry, we admitted only 34 students in the Albanian-language class who satisfied the conditions for continuing their education,” Roci told Dnevnik on 15 September.

Students must meet certain grade requirements in order to be considered for continuing their education in high schools.

On 20 September, Deputy Education Minister Tale Geramitcioski told A1 TV there would be no Albanian-language classes in Bitola, and requested that the students return to their classrooms.

By 22 September, protests had halted in Bitola. But new protests began in nearby Gostivar, initiated by ethnic Albanian students in a show of support for Albanian-language classes in Bitola.

At the same time, however, the situation in Skopje has intensified as Education Minister Polozani decided to transfer seven Albanian-language classes from an all-Albanian high school in the Skopje neighborhood of Avtokomanda, to an all-Macedonian high school in the Skopje neighborhood of Cair, which is mostly Albanian-populated, saying that the former lacked satisfactory teaching conditions.

Until seven years ago, ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian students attended classes together in the now all-Macedonian high school in Cair.

“Now it is time to put an end to segregation,” said Agim Fazliu, head of the Ministry’s high-school sector.

Ethnic Macedonian parents, however, are protesting the minister’s attempts at desegregation and have pulled their children from classes in Cair, claiming that the school is too small to house both ethnic groups and that the conditions in the ethnic Albanian high school in Avtokomanda are satisfactory.

“The parental board cannot decide where children should attend classes. This is something we agreed on with the school’s management,” Fazliu responded.

While ethnic Macedonian parents staged peaceful protests in Skopje, a number of student incidents resulted in police intervention. To calm the situation, the Ministry was again forced to put its decision on hold, as it was in Bitola.

Ethnic Macedonian parents in Skopje also have called for Polozani’s resignation.

The situation has clearly illustrated how children are increasingly becoming tools for political manipulation and inter-ethnic animosity that has permeated Macedonian society. And with the youth being pulled further into the political arena, the future of a multi-ethnic Macedonia, indeed, looks further and further away.


Related Stories:

BRR News: The Segregation Solution
Macedonia decides on ethnically segregated schools as a solution to ethnic tensions.
26 May 2003

BRR News: Back to the Past?
Rebel activity and police action spark fears of violent destabilization in Macedonia.
8 September 2003

For more articles on the Balkans, visit our Balkan page, at http://balkanreport.tol.cz.

Kazakhs Vote In Key Test of Democracy

ALMATY, Kazakhstan--Previously seen as being of minor importance, local elections to city, district, and provincial councils have assumed major prominence this year. The vote, which was held on 20 September, comes after nearly two years of increased political tension and is being seen as a gauge of the democratic intentions of the authorities, who soon are due to present a new election law to parliament.

The official Khabar television channel has presented a very positive picture of elections, saying the electorate was very active and that the elections generally met democratic standards. But the chief opposition party, the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK), reports that many independent observers were not allowed to go to polling stations on the day of the vote, 20 September.

Another opposition Web site, zhakiyanov.info, also claims candidates were exposed to blatant pressure by the authorities in all regions of the country. It reported that police in Semipalatinsk took a candidate from her apartment to face prosecutors shortly before the poll and asserted that the incident was repeated in other parts of the country.

Other reports talk of smear campaigns against opposition candidates, delays in registration, a failure to provide promised state funding, unwillingness on the part of local councils to provide space for opposition meetings, and delays in receiving required certification from psychiatrists to prove candidates were of sound mind.

The DCK faced another major challenge in the run-up to the elections when one of its co-founders, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, who is currently sitting out a seven-year jail sentence for abuse of power, appeared on television promising to abandon politics in return for a presidential pardon.

The DCK said the videotape, which was shown on 15 September, was a “montage.” It claimed to know “for certain that Galymzhan Zhakiyanov refused to sign the statement on backsliding political activity. That is why the regime decided to fabricate it in order to discredit the politician and to present him as an ‘ordinary criminal.’”

It believes the authorities were aiming “on the one hand, to compromise the leader of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan movement … and on the other hand, to make Kazakh society and the international community believe that any future refusal to grant [him] a pardon is because there are new criminal charges against him.”

On 6 August, Zhakiyanov, who, the opposition said, suffered from tuberculosis, wrote to President Nursultan Nazarbaev asking for a pardon. But he refused to give up his political activity.

The National Security Committee, the Kazakh successor to the KGB, subsequently launched investigations against the DCK leader.

Zhakiyanov’s alleged plea came four months after another jailed DCK founder, Mukhtar Ablyazov, was granted a pardon and announced that he was stepping off the political stage.

Whether real, the videotape could not have been better timed to unsettle the DCK and reduce the number of votes it might win. It could also potentially be seen as a snub to the European Parliament, which on 3 September wrote to Nazarbaev calling on him “to urgently consider … and give a public response to Zhakiyanov’s appeal for pardon.”

NEW ELECTION LAW, GREATER DEMOCRACY?

The opposition was eager to put up a strong fight to keep a foothold in Kazakhstan’s political system.

But the opposition is not expecting any success in the elections, as they say the Kazakh authorities will not allow their candidates to win.

International organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have labeled Kazakhstan’s election law undemocratic in the past.

The government now plans to change the law to bring it more into line with OSCE standards. Kazakhstan is bidding to chair the OSCE in 2009.

The draft bill was published in July, but has not been sent to parliament for approval. The government says it wants to increase public debate before passing it to parliament.

Critics contend, though, that the authorities delayed the process in order to prevent the bill coming into effect for the local elections.

Under the new law, each provincial council would then select two people to be members of the upper house of the national parliament. The city councils would appoint the members of the local election commissions. This weekend’s elections, therefore, have the ability to influence both national politics and the quality of democratic control at grassroots level.

Supposedly due to enhance democracy, the bill has come in for some heavy criticism. Independent observers fear that the new bill would, if passed as drafted, reduce the authorities’ democratic accountability, as the bill would "forbid any direct or indirect financing of sociologists, independent observers, and journalists of the Republic of Kazakhstan by international organizations, international nongovernmental organizations, foreign governments, foreign legal entities, and citizens."

Many nongovernmental organizations rely on foreign organizations for funding.

The government had claimed that the bill was drafted with the help of nongovernmental organizations and the opposition, an assertion denied by the DCK.

The Kazakh authorities recently announced that they are setting up a Public Committee for Election Control. The body would be independent, but the choice of an ally of the president to head the committee has raised doubts.

More generally, opposition leaders argue that the entire whole political system needs to be reformed before elections can be considered free and fair.

The new law would not affect one of the fundamental complaints of the opposition, the very tight registration requirements imposed on political parties in mid-2002. The conditions would effectively eliminate regional parties, and demand large-scale support before a party could be registered. So far, only seven parties have been registered and are eligible to stand in parliamentary elections due in 2004.

Only one of those parties--the Communist Party--does not back the president. The Communist Party is not a leading voice in the opposition, though it has been trying to increase cooperation with two opposition groups--Pokolenie, and the LAD movement, which represents Slavs.


Related Articles:

A Regression Report
Washington may think things are improving in Kazakhstan, but democracy is in crisis in Kazakhstan. And so is the opposition.
by Rashid Dyussambaev
1 August 2003

For more articles on Kazakhstan, visit our Kazakhstan country file, at http://kazakhstan.tol.cz.


PM's Feud With Security Chief Divides Slovak Cabinet

BRATISLAVA, Slovakia--Slovakia's good-guy image as a reform-minded friend of the West is looking a little tattered.

The center-right coalition is in crisis again, but this time the problem for Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda is not his fractious partners. It's his own secretive behavior and conspiratorial talk, which some observers compare to the bad old days of Vladimir Meciar, when Slovakia was the pariah of Central Europe.

The tension began when Dzurinda asked the cabinet to recall the head of the National Security Office (NBU), Jan Mojzis, on 9 September. When Defense Minister Ivan Simko, Dzurinda’s fellow Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) party member, refused to vote for Mojzis's removal, the prime minister went for Simko as well, asking the party to recall him and later informing President Rudolf Schuster of his decision.

Two coalition parties, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), and the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK), have refused to back Dzurinda's attempt to oust Mojzis.

So far, the prime minister's only stated reason for seeking Mojzis's recall was his "total loss of trust" in the official.

Announcing his decision to ask the cabinet to vote Mojzis out of a job, however, he told the press, “I care very much about the fight against corruption and clientelism," but gave no details.

Dzurinda's efforts to oust Mojzis and Simko, whatever the eventual outcome, may damage Slovakia's image abroad. With much success, Dzurinda managed to undo much of the damage to the country's reputation done by Vladimir Meciar and his nationalist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). Slovakia is due to join both NATO and the European Union in 2004.

NATO is watching the situation closely. The alliance's security chief, Wayne Rychak, paid an unexpected visit to Slovakia on 12 September and met with Mojzis. NATO General Secretary George Robertson called Dzurinda on 11 September for an update on the Simko situation.

The British and American ambassadors to Slovakia both expressed their satisfaction with the work of NBU and their trust in Mojzis.

"Our confidence in the [NBU] has not changed. We believe that the process that is taking place there is the kind of process which has been confirmed by the U.S. and NATO," U.S. Ambassador Ronald Weiser told the daily SME on 18 September.

President Rudolf Schuster is likely to formally accept Simko's resignation by early October.

MECIAR REDUX?

Some in the media and the opposition have taken to comparing Dzurinda’s actions to those of Meciar. His terms in office were marked by increasing concentration of power in his hands. He brooked little dissent from his own or any other party, even less so from foreign leaders.

Meciar often spoke of conspiracies and enemies within the country. Dzurinda took up a similar line in August when he spoke to the press about a "little group" that threatened Slovakia’s security. He refused to name names, merely stating, "All I had to say I have said in the right place, to the prosecutor." He said he obtained his information from the security service (SIS).

When the opposition deputy of the Smer party Robert Kalinak, who heads the parliamentary security committee, released to the media a list of people he alleged were part of Dzurinda's "little group," the prime minister refused to comment on the list's reliability but called Kalinak "a liar."

The list included several influential business people, SME editor-in-chief Martin M. Simecka, Radio Free Europe senior reporter Milan Zitny, and Mojzis.

Dzurinda´s headstrong behavior continues to puzzle the media and analysts.

In an editorial on 11 September, SME commented that now, when Slovakia has a foot in the civilized world, Dzurinda is putting the country's hard-won trustworthiness at risk.

It still remains for Slovakia to "tidy up" at home, the paper said. "The head of the office that does the most sensitive part of this tidying up [Mojzis], has the full support of our future partners. It was the trust the partners abroad had in Dzurinda that opened the doors to the civilized world. Now he is willing to put this trust at stake. He must have his reasons for it. This is a chilling revelation: we have already had such a prime minister [Meciar]."

Dzurinda may be acting on behalf of large companies who failed to get past the NBU's strict security checks, suggested Ivo Samson of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association think tank. The NBU is responsible for checking all companies and persons likely to come into contact with secret or sensitive information.

"Mojzis was tough. He did not defend the interests of groups around the governmental establishment, and did defend NATO interests," Samson told journalists in Banska Bystrica on 19 September. "Under pressure [from these economic interests], the prime minister lost his patience," he said.

The government has announced plans to purchase expensive information systems for its own information network, the state financial planning agencies, and a security system for the Slovak-Ukrainian border. Foreign-based firms including Hewlett-Packard, Siemens, and Cisco Systems (via the Slovak company Ditek) have participated in earlier tenders for the financial systems.

Slovak companies lacking NBU security approval will be prevented from taking part in the tenders, and so could foreign companies' high-level Slovak employees and their suppliers.

The four-party coalition is now struggling with the problems raised by Dzurinda's enmity toward Mojzis. Dzurinda's SDKU and the smallest coalition member, ANO, are backing the prime minister, while the SMK and KDH continue to demand clearer reasons to sack the NBU head.

“I've asked the prime minister to pay attention to the country's strategic needs rather than to create tensions and distrust,” KDH leader Pavol Hrusovsky said on 18 September. As the government makes plans for taxation reform and changes to the pension and health systems, the coalition's fragile majority in parliament may come under attack.

As it seems unlikely Dzurinda will give up his post over a conflict with a civil servant--even one with the domestic and foreign backing Mojzis so far enjoys--Slovakia is likely to see some hard political bargaining soon.


News: Slovak TV Mogul in the Political Spotlight Again
26 August - 1 September 2003

News: Fetal Positions
Abortion row shakes Slovakia’s governing coalition.
17 - 23 June 2003

Looking for articles on Slovakia from 1994 to 1999? Check out the old Transition magazine. Looking for old print copies? Buy it at our e-store. For our latest articles, visit our country file, at http://slovakia.tol.cz.

Zhirinovsky’s Belarusian Offspring Cleans Up Its Act

MINSK, Belarus--The Liberal Democratic Party is fighting on one front to distance itself from its shadowy past and on another to avoid being disbanded by the authorities.

The rightist party has three months to meet a deadline set by the Justice Ministry to show that it qualifies as a functioning political party or face being disbanded. On 17 September, the ministry ruled the party was "judicially insolvent."

Following the surprises at the party's convention in early September, many observers think the crisis may lead to a political re-birth for the small right-wing party, if it can retain its official standing.

For eight years, the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus (LDPB) and its leader Siarhei Gaidukevich have been inseparably tied. As the party's convention drew near, few doubted that the 221 delegates would select Gaidukevich as their candidate for the 2006 presidential election.

After the 6 September gathering, not only was Gaidukevich not the party's presidential candidate, he was not even a secretary of the convention, having lost the vote to Alyaksandr Rabatay, his first deputy.

A rebellion, of sorts, had broken out in the ranks of the right-wing party.

During the debates, another deputy chairman, Aleh Markevich, accused Gaidukevich of authoritarianism, marginalizing the party, and corruption.

“The LDPB has become a private corporation serving the needs of Gaidukevich and his family,” Markevich said.

The party leader was also blamed for the LDPB's failures in parliamentary, presidential, and local elections. Regional party organizations accused Gaidukevich of abandoning them.

Having lost control over the convention, Gaidukevich and a group of his supporters left the hall, outnumbered by the newly-emerged opposition. Talking to journalists, the ousted leader said the convention was illegitimate and promised to organize a new one in three weeks.

The remaining delegates then amended the party statutes, removing Gaidukevich from the post of chairman and, instead of a successor, establishing a five-person supreme council. Markevich and Rabatay were elected to the council, along with Andrey Kurs, Vital Pryshchepau (chairman of the party's Vitebsk branch), and Siarhei Talk (head of the Babrujsk branch). After a furious half-hour's work restructuring the party, delegates had to empty the rented hall.

The following week Gaidukevich and Rabatay each presented their version of events to the Justice Ministry, hoping to stave off liquidation. They were told to settle difference within three months and to have no contact with other parties during that time. If no compromise is found, the ministry will suspend the party.

ZHIRINOVSKY'S CHILDREN

The LDPB was founded under the strong influence of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), the populist party headed by the rambunctious Vladimir Zhirinovsky that enjoyed large support in the early 1990s. A Belarusian branch of the Russian party was formed in 1991. The LDPB was established in 1994, and Gaidukevich became leader in 1995.

Although Gaidukevich ended the party's involvement with security businesses that had earned it a reputation for links to crime figures, the shadows have lurked around the party's activities ever since.

In April 1996, LDPB and LDPR signed an agreement on political and financial cooperation that never saw fruit. The Russian and Belarusian populist parties slowly drifted apart, but connections to Russian capital also became part of LDPB's image.

The party claims 24,000 members, a figure doubted by the Justice Ministry, which issued an official warning in August, saying this claim had little connection with reality and that several regional branches were not functioning. If the party receives a second warning within one year, the ministry has the power to shut it down.

Even with its recognizable, if misleading "Liberal Democratic" brand name, the Belarusian party did not have the success its Russian original enjoyed in the early and mid-1990s. No LDPB member has been elected to parliament. Gaidukevich was more successful, however, in carefully cultivating an image of the rabble-rousing leader reminiscent of Zhirinovsky.

Born in 1954, Gaidukevich is a professional soldier holding the rank of lieutenant-colonel. He is now in the reserves. In 1982-1983 he served in Iraq as an air-defense specialist. Like Zhirinovsky, he is alleged to have maintained ties to Saddam Hussein. After retiring from full service, Gaidukevich headed a state committee on the protection of servicemen, militia, and KGB personnel.

Gaidukevich has never been averse to shedding his political skin. In the early 1990s, he advocated the restoration of the Soviet Union and condemned Belarusian nationalism. Within a few years he spoke only of economic integration with Russia, and stressed the need to preserve national independence.

During the 2001 presidential election, he competed in the final round against Lukashenka and opposition candidate Uladzimir Hancharyk. Some in the opposition accused him of discrediting their candidate and stealing democratic votes without any hope of winning himself. Lukashenka won that election and is widely expected to push parliament to alter the constitution so as to allow him to run again in 2006.

BUSINESS NATIONALISTS

The new leaders of LDPB want to fix the party's notorious image.

“We have distanced ourselves from Zhirinovsky,” Markevich said. Fellow co-leader Rabatay said the party should represent "national business"--not the shadow economy, but the legitimate one.

“We want national business, which was once trampled for the sake of Russian capital, to be rehabilitated. The rebirth of national business will strengthen national independence. I see LDPB as a respectable party of all business circles,” Rabatay said.

The new leadership also demands an amnesty for business people who fled the country, taking large amounts of capital with them. No other party has proposed such a step.

A new coalition of Belarusian democratic forces is emerging as parliamentary elections approach. The Central Electoral Commission said earlier this month that 17 October 2004 was a potential date for the vote.

Whether any such coalition would include the LDPB is a very open question. First, the opposition, after burning its fingers more than once with Gaidukevich, will have to be persuaded that the LDPB will try to be either liberal or democratic.


Related Articles:

News: NGOs in the Crosshairs
Legal-aid group becomes the latest civic organization to fall victim to Belarusian authorities' deep distrust of the third sector.
9 - 15 September 2003

News: Belarusian President Steps Up the Propaganda
19 - 25 August 2003

Notes from Ulyanovsk: Zhirinovsky the Unsinkable
11 June 2003

For more on Belarus, visit our Belarus country file, at http://belarus.tol.cz.